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Bookmark not defined.ivFROM REFUGE TO REFUGEE: THE AFRICAN CASE
1
by
Charles Geisler and Ragendra de Sousa
INTRODUCTION
In 1994, the United Nations Human Development Report introduced the concept of human
security, predicating it on the dual notion of safety from chronic threats of hunger, disease, and
repression on the one hand and protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in daily life on the
other (UNDP 1999). Environmental insecurity became shorthand for that dimension of human
insecurity induced by the combined effects of natural disasters and mismanaged environmental
endowment. Such thinking helped foster the notion of “environmental refugee” to describe a new
insight into an old phenomenon: large numbers of the world’s least secure people seeking refuge
from insecure biophysical environments.
As useful as this conceptual progression is, it can be misleading. It gives the impression that
reducing environmental insecurity will avail more human security and, by extension, result in
fewer environmental refugees. The error in this appealing formulation is not immediately
obvious, for the wisdom of reducing soil and forest loss, of safeguarding ground and surface
water supplies, and of not polluting the food chain or the earth’s atmosphere seems unassailable.
The error arises in another quarter. Environmental security, when defined as ever larger
protected areas free of human subsistence pressures, may bolster human security for some while
breaching it for those dwelling in the path of such conservation. Under certain circumstances,
more environmental security can generate a category of environmental refugees little noticed by
those who have popularized this term.
Africa is a region of much interest in sorting out the relationship between human and
environmental security. For one thing, nearly two-thirds of Africa’s population is still rural. At a
time when the global community is deepening its commitment to biodiversity conservation
through parks and protected areas, most of which are rural, a large proportion of Africa’s
population stands in the path of expanded protected areas. Moreover, Africa leads the world in
traditional political refugees—defined by the UN High Commission on Refugees as “Any person
who is outside the country of his (sic) nationality … because he has or had well-founded fear of
persecution by reason of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group
or political opinion and is unable or, because of such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the
protection of the government of the country of his nationality” (Goodwin-Gill 1983:5-6). The
environmental side-effects of political refugees are often enormous (Renner 1996).
                                                
1 Paper prepared for symposium in honor of John Cohen entitled: “African Governance and Civil Society: Equity,
Efficiency & Participation.” March 10-11, 2000, Cornell University. The authors thank Mary Krtiz, Norman Uphoff,
Duane Chapman, and Barbara Bedford for sharing helpful materials and comments related to this research.2
  Whereas research abounds on the threats caused to biodiversity and natural values by human
activities in their many forms, this study concerns itself with the significant threat caused to
human populations—often the most vulnerable humans—of exclusionary conservation. We
begin by characterizing the human insecurity linked to increasing environmental security via
protected area conservation, as a variant of environmental refugeeism. Using a combination of
land use change and case study approaches, we estimate the number of Africans experiencing
this phenomenon. We then place environmental refugeeism in the context of recent economic
development theory and suggest why environmental refugees, as employed here, are in double
jeopardy. That is, they often undergo a series of dislocations resulting from development
initiatives, one form of which is protected area greenlining. We conclude with a discussion of
one possible remedy for policy administrators seeking expanded conservation and a reduction in
human displacement.
THE EVOLVING MEANING OF “REFUGEE”
The typology of world refugees is changing. The 1967 definition stated above is widely disputed,
the line between refugee and displaced persons is blurring, and “refugee” is expanding to include
economic and humanitarian asylum-seekers. Those favoring a more inclusive definition assert
that refugee homelessness can be long or short-term; displacement can result from direct or
indirect violence; and asylum may or may not cross an international boundary. Increasingly, a
“refugee” is simply coming to mean “someone compelled to leave home” (Zolberg, Suhrke, and
Aguayo 1989).
In 1985 the UN Environmental Program formally recognized that a broad range of
environmental disasters can generate refugees (Westing 1992). Such refugees are the victims of
long-term mismanagement of nature by humans (soil erosion, greenhouse gases, toxification of
air, water, soil or food chain, deforestation and desertification), of massive public works intended
to control nature (dams, highways, power plants, urban renewal), or of unforeseen “acts of God.”
The environmental refugee reality has intensified interest in the interactions between
environmental and human security in diverse world settings (Kreimer and Munasinghe 1991,
Gadgil and Guha 1995, Leiderman 1995).
As refugee categories multiply, refugee numbers have tended to climb. According to the
strict 1967 UNHCR definition, a mere 13.5 million people were refugees in 1998 (World
Almanac 1999). This is up from most refugee estimates at mid-century but down from UNHCR
counts earlier in that decade. A more inclusive definition embracing environmental refugees tells
quite another story. Hinawi (1985), Jacobson (1988), Suhrke (1992), Myers (1993) and Hugo
(1995) all suggest that environmental disasters are dislocating people well in excess of UNHCR
refugee counts. A report completed late in 1998 (a particularly disaster-prone year) by the
Worldwatch Institute and the insurance industry found that 300 million people had been
displaced from their homes that year, or more than the combined populations of Canada and the
United States (Trenberth 1999). Sea-level changes and coastal evacuations following future
climate change may dwarf these numbers (Clark 1991, Birdsall 1992).
Our intention is to describe a category of environmental refugee omitted in the above
inventory of storms, floods, droughts, fires and El-Niño effects. These “other environmental
refugees” (OERs) are the victims of what Albert (1994:46) has termed “ecological3
expropriation.” They are people displaced by the creation of national parks and protected areas
without mitigation (Geisler 2000a). As with people displaced by natural or unnatural disasters,
civil wars, and ethnic cleansings, these refugees are forcibly removed from their homelands,
often without notice or consultation. Environmentally sophisticated land reform, we shall see, is
an under-appreciated mitigation strategy.
ESTIMATING ACTUAL OER NUMBERS
Unlike traditional refugees who cross national boundaries and gather in rehabilitation centers and
camps, OERs have few logical gathering points and are difficult to enumerate. They diffuse into
subsistence landscapes, migrate to the informal sector of cities and villages, and dissolve into
wage labor ranks of agribusiness, mines, and ecotourism ventures, if they find work at all. Often
their plights are unpublicized by the same government and nongovernmental agencies which
contribute to their creation. Nor do OERs typically plead for restitution. Their land titles are
fragile at best; their legal resources are minimal; they are often ethnically disadvantaged. In the
case of Africa, they may already be political refugees with precarious standing and substantial
resource requirements (fuelwood, potable water, basic nutrition). Renner (1996) shows in both
Asia and Africa how the line blurs between traditional and environmental refugees; many of the
world’s desperately poor have multiple refugee statuses.
Despite these obstacles, there are several ways in which OERs can be estimated. One is
indirect, based on land conversion trends. It depends heavily on the public land base set aside for
exclusive conservation, though it tends to overlook the growing number of private protected
areas being established worldwide (e.g., Langholtz, et al. 2000). A second approach extrapolates
to regions or continents from single-country estimation models of conservation opportunity
costs. A final technique is through case studies of human displacement from protected areas;
while more direct, it necessarily offers an incomplete picture of OER counts for entire regions.
All three methods are, at best, gross approximations of the OER phenomenon.
The results of the indirect, area-based technique appear in table 1. Early in this century,
national parks were still an oddity in most countries and few in number. By 1997, parks and
protected areas accounted for 841 million hectares in IUCN categories I-V, and another 414
million hectares were internationally recognized and semi-protected as IUCN VI-VIII lands (see
appendix for description of IUCN categories).
2 More and more governments are taking stock of
their remaining wilderness and semi-wilderness zones and are assigning them protected status of
one kind or another. The 1997 total is twice that of 1985, suggesting that a significant base is
undergoing significant growth, at least on paper.
                                                
 
2 Recent work by Brandon, Redford, and Sanderson (1998:4-5) states that over 13,000 sites protect about 8.9
percent of the earth’s surface if all eight IUCN categories are included (the least restrictive being Biosphere
Reserves, World Heritage Sites & International Wetlands) and marines sites are included. This “protection” is
misleading, they note, since true protection (management primarily for biodiversity conservation) is problematic for
all but a few sites.4
Table 1: Global protection of natural areas, 1985 and 1997
Region Number 1985 area
(1000ha)
% of land Number 1997 Area
(1000ha)
% of Land
Africa 443 88,662 3.0 746 154,043 5.2
Asia 790 52,414 2.0 1,733 162,877 5.3
Central America &
Caribbean
—— —— —— 414 14,793 5.6
South America —— —— —— 810 129,014 7.4
United States &
Canada
329 87,895 —— 2,333 214,714 11.7
Europe 704 17,239 3.6 2,943 14,141 ——
USSR/Russia 141 15,111 0.7 210 51,670 3.1
Oceania 739 38,232 4.5 1,212 60,382 7.1
World 3,613 423,774 3.2 10,401 841,041 6.4
Sources: WRI/UNEP/UNDP (1986,1998)
Africa’s protected areas grew from 443 (88,662,000 hectares, or 3 percent of the continent’s
land mass) in 1985 to 746 in 1997 (154,043,000 hectares or 5.2 percent). Even if a more
restrictive definition of “protected area” is employed (IUCN categories I-III), the geographical
implications remain considerable (300 protected areas or 90,091,000 hectares).
3 Virtually all
African countries have increased their protected land base since 1985,
4 and seven have
designated over 10 percent of their land area to protected area status (table 2). Twenty-two
exceed the average for protected area as a percentage of total African land area; 11 of these show
intermediate population densities (over 40 people per 100 hectares). Among these, Burundi and
Rwanda both report over 200 persons per 100 hectares and are Africa’s most densely populated
countries after Mauritius. In 14 countries, the land designated as protected exceeds the land
designated as cropland.
If, as suggested by Boserup (1981), “sparse” settlement of a square kilometer (100ha) ranges
from 1-16 persons, then the OER population for Africa ranges from 1.5 to 24.5 million people
using IUCN categories I-V. The more restrictive categories (I-III) yield an estimate of 900,000 to
14.4 million OERs. These estimates are disquieting not only in their magnitude but also in the
fact that most of the displacement in question seems to have occurred in the last three decades.
                                                
3 IUCN Categories I-III are the most restrictive/protective and therefore the most likely to exclude humans for other
than scientific or touristic purposes.
4 This information is not presented in table 2 but is available from the authors.5
Table 2. African protected areas, land and population in context










3ha) % land area Cropland
1992-94
World 13,048,300 5,929,839 442 10,401 841,041 6.40 1,465,814
Africa 2,963,468 778,484 249 746 154,043 5.20 189,803
Algeria 238,174 30,175 121 18 5,891 2.50 8,088
Angola 124,670 11,967 90 12 8,181 6.60 3,500
Benin 11,062 5,881 503 2 778 7.00 1,880
Botswana 56,673 1,551 26 8 10,497 18.5 420
Burkina Faso 27,360 11,402 394 12 2,855 10.40 3465
Burundi 2,568 6,589 423 9 144 5.60 1,120
Cameroon 46,540 14,323 291 16 2,097 4.50 7,040
Central African Rep 62,298 3,489 54 13 5,110 8.20 2,020
Chad 125,920 6,892 52 9 11,494 9.10 3,256
Congo, Dem. Rep 34,150 49,208 78 11 10,191 4.50 0.170
Congo, Rep 226,705 2,822 206 9 1,545 4.50 7,900
Cote d’Ivoire 31,800 14,567 441 11 1,986 6.20 4,031
Egypt 99,545 65,675 636 12 793 0.80 3,137
Equatorial Guinea 2,805 430 146 N/A N/A N/A 230
Eritrea 10.000 3,548 328 3 501 5.00 366
Ethiopia 100,000 62,111 582 20 5,518 5.50 12,197
Gabon 25,767 1,170 43 5 723 2.80 460
Gambia, The 1,000 1,194 1,141 4 22 2.20 165
Ghana 22,754 18,857 784 9 1,104 4.80 4,407
Guinea 24,572 7,673 306 3 164 0.70 787
Guinea-Bissau 2,812 1.134 388 N/A N/A N/A 340
Kenya 56,914 29,020 488 36 3,504 6.2 4,520
Lesotho 3,035 2,184 685 1 7 0.20 320
Liberia 9,632 2,748 233 1 129 1.30 371
Libya 175,954 5,980 32 6 173 0.10 2,170
Madagascar 58,154 16,348 264 36 1,119 1.90 3,105
Malawi 9,408 10,377 1,046 9 1,059 11.30 1,700
Mali 122,019 11,832 91 13 4,532 3.70 2,569
Mauritania 102,522 2,453 23 4 1,746 1.70 208
Mauritius 203 1,154 5,562 3 12 6.00 106
Morocco 44,630 28,012 605 7 316 0.70 9,686
Mozambique 78,409 18,691 227 11 4,779 6.10 3,180
Namibia 82,329 1,653 19 16 10,616 12.90 7046










3ha) % land area Cropland
1992-94
Niger 126,670 10,119 75 6 9,694 7.70 4,035
Nigeria 91,077 121,773 1,263 20 3,020 3.30 32,579
Rwanda 2,467 6,528 2,188 5 362 14.70 1,150
Senegal 19,253 9,001 443 9 2,180 11.30 2,355
Sierra Leone 7,162 4,577 600 2 82 1.10 540
Somalia 62,734 10,653 157 1 180 0.30 1,026
South Africa 122,104 44,295 347 232 6,578 5.40 15,200
Sudan 237,600 28,526 115 11 8,642 3.60 12,975
Swaziland 1,720 931 512 2 35 2.00 191
Tanzania 88,359 32,189 349 30 13,816 15.60 3,660
Togo 5,439 4,434 772 8 428 7.90 2,420
Tunisia 15,536 9,497 589 6 44 0.30 4,882
Uganda 19,965 21,318 1,015 32 1,910 9.60 6,780
Zambia 74,339 8,690 111 21 6,364 8.60 5,273
Zimbabwe 38.685 11,924 296 25 3,068 7.9 2,876
Source: WRI/UNDP/UNEP (1998: 244, 286, 298)
The second estimation procedure builds on intensive analysis performed in Kenya, a country
with 3.5 million hectares in IUCN categories I-V (or 6.2 of its land base in 1997). Roughly a
decade ago researchers calculated the opportunity costs of biodiversity conservation in that
country (Norton-Griffiths and Southey 1995). They tried to determine the net benefits from
converting lands set aside for parks and reserves to agriculture and livestock production. The
research generated dollar estimates of $99 million in net returns (about 1.4 percent of Kenya’s
1989 GDP), using a conservation land base of 41,420 km
2. Human population for this area was
estimated to be 2.1 million rural inhabitants, based on adjusted 1979 census data using a
conservative per annum growth rate of l.035 percent.
This Kenyan estimate yields a human density of 50.7 people per square kilometer. If the
social and ecological carrying capacity of Kenya is typical of Africa as a whole, there would be
78 million OERs for the continent, using the same protected area land base employed in the first
approach. Using the more restrictive categories (I-III), the OER extrapolation to all of Africa
falls to 45.7 million. Because table 2 suggests, however, that in 1996 Kenya’s population density
was nearly twice that of Africa as a whole, it is prudent to reduce both these estimates by half:
39.5 million OERs for the more inclusive IUCN classification and 22.9 million for its more
restrictive counterpart. These estimates exceed those of the first approach; they suggest what
Africa’s “protected” land might support if resettled by Africans and opened to multiple economic
uses.
Case studies offer a third and somewhat different approach to OER estimation. Researchers
for at least four decades have made counts of OERs evicted from specific Africa’s parks. Their7
findings are summarized in table 3 and make the broad-brush estimates reported above more
concrete. These estimates do not use consistent definitions of OERs, yet in the aggregate they
suggest that the social-cultural impact of large-scale, long-lasting conservation may have
devastated hundreds of thousands of African lives. These estimates would rise if partial refugees
were added to the tally, that is, those people living outside of protected areas but depending on
them for basic resources. Offsetting this “partial eviction” is the fact that, in many protected
areas, evicted park inhabitants reenter protected domains illegally and are thereby not “fully
evicted” from protected habitats.
Table 3: OER case studies in selected African countries
Country Park name Area
1 (ha) OER Reference
Botswana Central Kalahari GR 5,180,000 39,000 Kelso 1993
Colchester 1994
Cameroon Korup NP 125,900 1,000 Colchester 1994
Kenya Amboseli NP 39,206 6,000 Western 1982
Madagascar Mananara Biosphere
Project
23,000 35,000 Ghimire 1994





















Yeager and Miller 1986,
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l998








33,915 30,000 Colchester 1994
Zimbabwe Nyanga NP 33,000 200 Ranger 1989
Moore 1994
NP=National Park; GR=Game Reserve
aThese families are allowed to use the park area for 15 days a year to collect honey
1Source: Protected Areas of the World-Afrotropical Volume 3. The World Conservation Union, Gland Switzerland.
The following capsules summarize selected OER cases from table 3:
Uganda. National park privations were detailed with disturbing intensity by Turnbull in
1972 and again by Calhoun in 1991. The former’s research among the Ik of Kidepo National
Park was among the earliest OER studies. More recently, mass expulsions of forest dwellers and
peasant settlers in Uganda resulted from a wildlife corridor between Kibale Forest Reserve and
Queen Elizabeth National Park. Some 30,000 people were expelled from the corridor without
warning, “leading to serious human rights violations, mass impoverishment, burning, looting, the8
killing of livestock, and deaths of indigenous people” (Feeney 1993, cited in Colchester
1994:14).
Botswana. The Central Kalahari Game Reserve is one of six cases in Botswana that have
generated significant OER numbers. Most are Bushmen from the Central Kalahari, the victims of
tribal warfare in which an opposing tribe gained political power and marginalized their Bushmen
enemies. More recently, when game-ranching reserves began to prosper, those in power
protected more land and evicted nearly 40,000 Bushmen yet again—a people uniquely adapted to
the forbidding environment in question. Such behavior may have occurred in the absence of
protected areas, but their establishment offered a “legitimate” excuse for draconian intertribal
punishment.
Cameroon. Even case studies are at times vague about the real human costs and counts
related to eviction. Cameroon’s Korup National Park, residence in which has been illegal since
1981, is a resource base to many villages beyond the technical park boundaries. Some
conservationists argue that even the park’s buffer zone is also off-limits to habitation (Colchester
1994), and there are an unknown number of area residents who have voluntarily relocated out of
the immediate region, making OER counts uncertain though by no means a fiction.
Madagascar. International donors (World Bank, USAID, WWF) joined forces to establish
the Biosphere Project in 1990. The displacement of 35,000 local residents is conveyed in
Ghimire’s (1994) evaluation report of that zone. Other national parks, such as Ranomafama,
have dislocated smaller numbers and partially mitigated the impacts with a variety of projects in
the multiple-use buffer zones circling the park.
South Africa. Eviction from South African protected areas is at least a century old and
complicated by racial policies which aggressively used conservation to gain international
acceptance. According to Carruthers (1995), since the 1890s whites curtailed the basic rights of
Africans in areas of high biodiversity or outright expelled them. The Homelands (bantustans) to
which the latter were confined under apartheid were themselves reduced in size for conservation
ends. Letsoalo (1994) gives examples of these set-asides: 70,000ha in KwaZulu and a minimum
of 55,000ha in Bobhuthatswana. Of the 178 national parks and game reserves in South Africa,
Kruger is the largest (almost 2 million hectares, or larger than Israel). It was initially depopulated
during the Boer War. Rather that allow the return of African refugees following hostilities, the
Boers created a vast park and removed remaining villagers from Kruger and other newly
designated protected areas (partly motivated by labor shortages in mines and urban centers
elsewhere in the country (Carruthers 1989, 1994, 1995)). As happened in other African
countries, Kruger’s managers used the Yellowstone model to justify complete exclusion of local
inhabitants, converting the entire park to a fenced “exclosure.”
Tanzania. Over a quarter of Tanzania’s land is protected in some fashion, with almost 14
percent in national parks as of the early 1990s. Tanzania is generally ranked among the 10
poorest countries in the world, where approximately 80 percent of the agricultural production is
conducted by peasant households. It represents both direct and indirect eviction processes.
Today, Maasailand is filled with national parks—the Serengeti, Manyara, Tarangire, Arusha, and
Kilimanjaro—and the vast Ngorongoro Conservation Area which has gone from multiple use
status to ever-stricter prohibitions on cultivation and grazing. “To sum up,” writes Arhem
(1986:250), “for the Ngorongoro Maasai, twenty years of conservation rule has brought falling
living standards and increasing poverty. For the majority of pastoralists [1,200 Maasai], food and9
health standards have declined.” Compensation promised for leaving national parks zones has
not materialized and survival in conservation areas is less and less viable due to incremental use
restrictions. Neumann (1998) sites studies documenting over 55,000 persons removed from
protected areas, notes that another 5,000 pastoralists were forced out of the Umba-Mkomazi
Game Reserve after refusing to obey a government eviction order in l988, and offers an in-depth
case study of lost rights of use and access by Mount Meru villagers over the past century.
Togo. Mimicking Kenya and Tanzania, Togo converted its two parks listed in table 3 in the
1980s to unpeopled places to capture growing ecotourism revenues. Both conversions came as
surprises to local communities and were imposed from above by the national government.
Residents were given one week to vacate villages in the parks and were forcibly removed
thereafter. In the 1990s, when democratic rule came to Togo, OERs violently confronted park
managers for restitution and resettlement.
Zimbabwe. Much admired for its progressive conservation experiments, Zimbabwe has a
parallel history of national park evictions. Ranger (1989) offers a rich history of vacillating
policies toward native inhabitants of Matobo (or Matopos) National Park, the 2,000 inhabitants
of which, before being evicted in the middle of the 20th century, were driven off other lands
various times under a variety of justifications.
The exact number of African OERs will perhaps never be known, but the estimation
procedures presented here suggest that their magnitude is not trivial. The OERs represented in
table 3 exceed half a million people for a handful of protected areas in 10 out of 48 African
counties. The area-based approach used first yields a range of 900,000 to l4,000,000 OERs
(IUCN I-III) or of 1.5 to 24.5 million OERs (IUCN I-V), depending on density assumptions. The
second approach extrapolates from the Kenyan opportunity cost analysis and leads to still larger
estimates: 23 to 44.5 million OERs. The OER estimates from the case studies, though far from
inclusive, place the phenomenon in more precise social and historical context and reduce the
hypothetical quality accompanying the former approaches. None of the estimates account for
assorted forms of indirect OER growth, the most important being those Africans who reside
outside the protected areas in question but blocked from access related to a broad range of
natural resources basic to their livelihood.
OERS IN DEVELOPMENT THEORY CONTEXT
Some might view the OER estimates presented here with skepticism because refugees could be
construed not just as people experiencing involuntary relocation but as people without resources
to self-relocate out of harm’s way. Table 4 focuses on the inverse relationship between human
security and environmental security, a subject posed at the outset of the paper. It ranks all
African countries by the developing country poverty index used by the United Nations
Development Program
5 and then re-ranks them by the percent of protected area in IUCN
categories I-V from table 2. It underscores that the poorest countries consistently have the
highest land percentages in protected status (Pearson rank-order correlation of .85).
                                                
5 This index concentrates on deprivation in three dimensions of human life: longevity, knowledge, and a decent
standard of living. For details, see UNDP (1999:163).10
The social impacts of biological greenlining are both positive and negative, depending on
which side of the line one stands. Perhaps the fundamental tragedy illuminated in the present
analysis is that many OERs have already moved, prior to the onset of large-scale conservation
initiatives, due to development project failures as well as successes. According to the
development paradigm popular in the 20th century, poorer nations follow in the footsteps of
wealthier ones by industrializing and, thereafter, exporting goods and services which spawn
leading sectors and allow the country’s economy to “modernize” (Neumann 1998; McMichael
2000). According to this widely accepted model, industrialization requires initial subsidies which
can take several forms—foreign assistance and loans from abroad and intersectoral transfers
from within. The latter routinely include the movement of agricultural surpluses at a low prices
to areas of urban-industrial concentration, thus holding down the cost of urban labor by lowering
food costs. Rising labor costs, from this perspective, siphon off earnings that are ideally
reinvested in capital equipment expansion.
  Several things about this paradigm are relevant to OER growth. First, contrary to the
model’s early reckoning, development of the kind just described has changed societies in a
variety of ways but alleviated neither poverty nor inequality. According the World Bank (1999),
the number of world inhabitants living on $1/day or less (the “desperately poor”) is steadily
increasing; according to UN Development Program (1999), the income gap between the richest
and poorest fifth has more than doubled over the past 3 decades. The Bank’s monitoring of
global poverty yields other sobering results: more than 80 countries have per capita incomes
lower than what they were a decade or more ago and 55 are experiencing falling per capita
incomes. The World Health Organization (1996) reports that 3 billion people (half the earth’s
current population) are malnourished. Dreams of sustainable development are giving way to
realities of sustained underdevelopment.
Just as significant, poor countries (both capitalist and socialist) have universally sought to
intensify and commercialize agriculture to achieve the theorized intersectoral shift. “Success”
typically is accompanied by larger production units and concentration of farming assets. The side
effects of such actions on smaller producers are summarized by Meliczek (1997:4):
Because of the need for immediate economic gains, many countries favoured the
establishment of large scale farming enterprises which produce monocrop export crops
and neglected the sector of small farmers whose situation deteriorated, leading to
increased poverty, indebtedness and growing landlessness.
Africa’s smallfarmers have, more often than not, been losers rather than winners as the
development paradigm played out. As Simon Kuznets (1965) predicted early on and later World
Bank findings confirm (Lele and Stone 1989), per capita supply of agricultural land in the
underdeveloped world has plummeted, forcing an outmigration of small holders. Some find
urban employment in the formal and informal sectors, others go abroad to save and remit what
they can. Still others find their way to export zones and maquiladora-type enclaves, or remain on
the land as wage laborers for the agribusinesses that replaced them.11
Table 4: Relationship between poverty and percent of land in IUCN Protected Area Status (I-V)
Rank Countries Percent
Protected Land
Rank Countries 1999 UNDP
Poverty Index
1 Botswana 18.50 1 Niger 65.50
2 Tanzania 15.60 2 Burkina Faso 59.30
3 Namibia 12.90 3 Sierra Leone 57.70
4 Malawi 11.30 4 Ethiopia 55.80
4 Senegal 11.30 5 Central Africa Rep. 53.60
6 Burkina Faso 10.40 6 Mali 52.80
7 Uganda 9.60 7 Chad 52.10
8 Chad 9.10 8 Benin 50.90
9 Zambia 8.60 9 Guinea 50.50
10 Central Africa Rep 8.20 10 Gambia, The 49.90
11 Togo 7.90 11 Senegal 49.60
11 Zimbabwe 7.90 12 Mozambique 49.50
13 Niger 7.70 13 Mauritania 47.50
14 Benin 7.00 14 Cote d’Ivoire 46.80
15 Cote d’Ivoire 6.20 15 Burundi 46.10
15 Kenya 6.20 16 Malawi 42.20
17 Mozambique 6.10 17 Uganda 40.60
18 Mauritius 6.00 18 Morocco 39.20
19 Burundi 5.60 19 Togo 38.40
20 Ethiopia 5.50 19 Zambia 38.40
21 South Africa 5.40 21 Nigeria 38.20
22 Ghana 4.80 22 Cameroon 38.10
23 Cameroon 4.50 23 Sudan 36.80
23 Congo, Rep. 4.50 24 Ghana 36.20
25 Mali 3.70 25 Egypt 33.00
26 Sudan 3.60 26 Congo, Rep. 32.30
27 Nigeria 3.30 27 Tanzania 29.80
28 Algeria 2.50 28 Zimbabwe 29.20
29 Gambia, The 2.20 29 Algeria 28.80
30 Swaziland 2.00 30 Kenya 28.20
31 Mauritania 1.70 31 Swaziland 27.60
32 Sierra Leone 1.10 32 Botswana 27.50
33 Egypt 0.80 33 Namibia 25.00
34 Guinea 0.70 34 Tunisia 23.10
34 Morocco 0.70 35 Lesotho 23.00
36 Tunisia 0.30 36 South Africa 19.10
37 Lesotho 0.20 37 Libya 16.40
38 Libya 0.10 38 Mauritius 12.10
39 Angola 6.60 39 Angola n.a
40 Congo, Dem. Rep 4.50 40 Congo, Dem. Rep n.a
41 Equatorial Guinea n.a 41 Equatorial Guinea n.a
42 Eritrea 5.00 42 Eritrea n.a
43 Gabon 2.80 43 Gabon n.a
44 Guinea-Bissau n.a 44 Guinea-Bissau 51.8
45 Liberia 1.30 45 Liberia n.a
46 Madagascar 1.90 46 Madagascar n.a
46 Rwanda 14.70 47 Rwanda n.a
48 Somalia 0.30 48 Somalia n.a
Sources: UNDP (1999:147-50), WRI/UNDP/UNEP (1988:244, 286, 289).  n.a.=not available, excluded from ranking and Pearson correlation calculations.12
This rather standard overview of migration and survival strategies by smallfarmers
overlooks another destination option for disenfranchised farmers in Africa and elsewhere:
biodiversity frontiers in their own or neighboring countries. Large numbers of landless peasants
have escaped their restructured agriculture by moving into zones simultaneously valued for
genetic richness, ecosystem properties, and tourism potential. As these refuges for resource-poor
people become conservation refuges for more affluent populations, national and international,
they became OER incubators. As conservation gathers momentum to protect these zones, human
security and environmental security collide.
6
CONCLUSION: LAND REFORM REFORMULATED
The above theorizing suggests that if the agricultural and environmental administration are not
coordinated, more OERs are virtually inevitable. Given the unlikely event that protected area
growth will cease or that visions of exclusionary protection will end, one must ask what tools are
at hand to reduce OER occurrences in Africa. One option is environmentally sophisticated land
reform, that is, land reform that puts environmental values on an equal footing with equity and
efficiency (Geisler 2000b). If this is done, the likelihood of buy-ins by conservation interests
increases considerably, and environmental and human security can be realigned.
There are numerous ways in which land reform can be adapted to conservation agendas,
despite the environmental mismanagement of numerous resettlement programs in the past. It
helps to recall that land reform is not a single template. It has been made-over many times to suit
diverse and evolving historical circumstances. Even more relevant, comprehensive land
reform—otherwise referred to as agrarian reform—is predisposed to holistic approaches to social
and environmental landscapes. Conceptually at least, agrarian reform has little aversion to
balancing the needs of human and biological communities, even as it struggles to overcome
institutional inertia, ideological opposition to state intervention in an era of privatization, and
indifference to land reform in the absence of Cold War politics.
Land reform in the name of conservation is not new. Some land reforms have embraced soil
conservation and reforestation as necessary to long-term productivity gains (e.g., the former
Soviet Union). In the 1980s, Brazil’s land reform agency assumed leadership of that country’s
expanding extractive reserve system, a model of extensive land reform intended to conserve
biodiversity within a tropical environment. In the 1990s, South Africa’s new land reform law
devoted a lengthy chapter to natural resource management and conservation. Zimbabwe
distinguishes between old and new residents of parks, granting the former “permits of residence”
and moving the latter onto ranch land with title security. If one follows the environmental
guidelines for resettlement generated by the UN’s Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO,
1988) or enlists nontraditional definitions of land reform—for example Australia’s Land Care
model, or the ever-greener farm bills emerging in North America—then the opportunities for
ecologically-coordinated agrarian reform appear to be many.
                                                
6 For a more elaborate versions and variations of this view of the social consequences of development theory, see
Lele and Stone (1989), Peluso (1993), and Black (1998).13
There are further reasons for believing that agrarian reform can complement environmental
management and mitigate OER effects. First, communities are more apt to conform to
conservation regimes that confer and secure property rights for community residents (Findley
1988, Lynch and Alcorn 1994). For example, tenure security is usually pivotal to affortestation;
conversely, title insecurity is often a prescription for deforestation via “land improvement”
(Dotzauer 1993).
7 Second, agrarian reform typically implies a shift from larger to smaller farm
units, and thus to greater reliance on annuals and perennials in place of grazing and other
extensive farming systems. Smaller units are more labor-absorbing (functional in capital-poor,
labor-abundant conditions) as well as labor efficient (World Bank 1975, Binswager and
Deininger 1993). Such farms also compare favorably with larger farmers in terms of genetic
diversity (Wilken 1987, Thurston et al. 1994). Finally, social equality is a goal of land
reform/agrarian reform, and some research suggests that equity correlates with lower human
fertility (National Academy of Sciences 1986).
There would seem, then, to be ample room for a social-environmental alliance in favor of
reformulated agrarian reform that counteracts the OER predicament. Such reform not only offers
institutionalized mitigation for those displaced by conservation but also offers hope for in situ
conservation and sustainability in resettlement areas. Were this routinized, OER recidivism to
protected areas would slacken, and land reform would receive the attention it deserves from
human rights and environmental justice advocates. Such reform has been used, with varying
degrees of success, to relieve the human hardships of protected area development in both Africa
(Cook 1994) and Latin America (Geisler 2000b). Moreover, at a macro level, agrarian reform is
an arena in which agricultural and ecological policy administrators can and should engage; an
example is the current collaboration between FAO and African governments to produce updated
soil and land cover maps for both conservation and production purposes.
The family of interests surrounding protected area policy—especially their social
dimensions—is today in turmoil. Many who were partial to integrated conservation and
sustainable development programming in the 1980s and 1990s are now in revolt. What was
politically correct then is giving way to environmental correctness, and conservation is taking a
conservative turn in Africa. Yet making protected areas more restrictive begs the question that
forged the family of interests two decades ago: what is to be done with communities that reside
therein and are destined to be OER spawning grounds if a new alliance is not found? The present
paper responds to this question by tallying African lands subject to protected area growth and
offering case studies that illuminate the social consequences of this growth. It argues that closing
these lands entirely to human habitation is untenable, unless new and viable alternatives are
offered. One mitigation strategy, ecologically-coordinated agrarian reform, is ventured as a way
of reinvigorating the social and environmental balance and reducing a looming yet little known
refugee problem.
                                                
7 In Latin America, Africa, and Asia, industry and the wealthier sectors of society are the most frequent beneficiaries
of practices that lead to forest degradation, while local inhabitants bear most of the costs of that resource degradation
(Dorner and Thiesenhusen 1992).1415
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APPENDIX: IUCN PROTECTED AREAS CATEGORIES*
Category I Strict Natural Reserve/Wilderness Area: protected areas managed mainly for science or
wilderness protection
Category Ia Strict Natural Reserve: protected area managed mainly for science
Definition Area of land and/or sea possessing some outstanding or representative ecosystems, geological or
physiological features and/or species, available primarily for scientific research and/or
environmental monitoring.
Category Ib Wilderness Area: protected area managed mainly for wilderness protection
Definition Large area of unmodified or slightly modified land and/or sea, retaining its natural character and
influence, without permanent or significant habitation, which is protected and managed so as
reserve its natural condition.
Category II National Park: protected area managed mainly for ecosystem protection and recreation
Definition Natural area of land and /or sea, designated to (a) protect the ecological integrity of one or more
ecosystems for present and future generations; (b) exclude exploitation or occupation inimical to
the purposes of designation of the areas; and (c) provide a foundation for spiritual, scientific,
educational, recreational and visitor opportunities, all of which must be environmentally and
culturally compatible.
Category III Natural Monument: protected area managed mainly for conservation of specific natural
features
Definition Area containing one, or more, specific natural or natural/cultural features which is of outstanding
or unique value because of its inherent rarity, representative or aesthetic qualities or cultural
significance.
Category IV Habitat/Species Management Area: protected area managed mainly for conservation
through management intervention
Definition Area of land and/or sea subject to active intervention for management purposes so as to ensure
the maintenance of habitats and/or to meet the requirements of specific species.
Category V Protected Landscape/Seascape: protected areas managed mainly for landscape/seascape
conservation and recreation
Definition Area of land, which coast and sea as appropriate, where the interaction of people and nature over
time had produced an area of distinct character with significant aesthetic, ecological and/or
cultural value, and often with high biological diversity. Safeguarding the integrity of this
traditional interaction is vital to the protection, maintenance and evolution of such an area
Category VI Managed Resource Protected Area: protected area managed mainly for sustainable use of
natural ecosystems
Definition Area containing predominantly unmodified natural systems, managed to ensure long-term
protection and maintenance of biological diversity, while providing at the same time a sustainable
flow of natural products and services to meet community needs
* A protected area is defined in the new Guidelines for Protected Area Management Categories as: An area of
land and/or sea especially dedicated to the protection and maintenance of biological diversity, and of natural
associated cultural resources, and managed through legal or other means.
Source: IUCN, 1985